Rather than summarizing a single procedural or litigation topic in this post, I’ll summarize the recent Supreme Court cases that have generalized significance to anyone who practices in federal courts. This past term has been breathtakingly impactful on the way our courts and government functions. While many of the cases have incredibly important political or human consequences, I’ll try to focus this post on the legal aspects of these cases—but at the same time recognizing that politics often motivates these legal decisions (particularly lately). There were too many cases to cover them all, so I’ve picked the top eight.

Universal or Nationwide Injunctions

Let’s start with the most controversial decision, Trump v. CASA, Inc., which tackled the question of whether district courts may issue universal or nationwide injunctions. The practice has become quite common, with conservative groups finding conservative judges to block Biden’s executive orders and liberal groups now finding judges to block Trump’s executive orders.

When the Biden administration asked the Court to block the authority of district court judges to issue universal injunctions, the Court declined to take up the issue, but promptly agreed to the Trump administration’s similar request. The administration’s request arose in the context of an executive order limiting the application of birthright citizenship. The order was so plainly unconstitutional that not even the government’s lawyers tried to support it, instead simply arguing that the injunctions issued by each of the courts to consider the order were limited to the parties to those actions, and that the administration was free to continue to enforce the order as to everyone else despite the repeated rulings that it was unconstitutional

In a 6-3 decision split along party lines, the Supreme Court agreed. The Court applied its originalism principles and observed that English courts of equity generally issued injunctive relief only to the named parties. The Court acknowledged that those courts could also issue “bills of peace,” but concluded that a bill of peace was more like a class action. Accordingly, the Court held, district courts lack the authority to issue a universal injunction outside the class action context.

The fact that both the Biden and Trump administrations complained about universal injunctions confirms their problematic nature. In general, it is relatively easy to find a judge that is extremely conservative or extremely liberal, figure out a way to get in front of that judge, and then ask that judge for a universal injunction blocking whatever law or order you oppose. When you think the law or executive order in question was properly promulgated and advances desirable policies, it seems crazy that one rogue judge could block that law for the entire country. Conversely, when you think that a law or executive order is plainly unconstitutional and multiple courts have agreed with you, a system that allows the continued enforcement of that law or order against anyone who has not yet personally prevailed in a lawsuit challenging that law or order seems ludicrous.

Justice Kavanaugh wrote in his concurrence that it should be the Supreme Court that ultimately decides the legality of a law or executive order, and he is correct. However, the path to get an issue before the Court differs in very significant ways depending on whether universal injunctions are allowed. The appellate rules provide for immediate, interlocutory appeal of injunction rulings. Thus, if a judge issues a universal injunction, the losing party may immediately appeal even if the injunction is only a TRO or preliminary injunction. When the court of appeals rules, the losing party may immediately petition for review by the Supreme Court. In that manner, a universal injunction would be subject to appellate review far more quickly than a final ruling in other types of cases.

Conversely, if injunctions are limited to the parties, then consider Executive Order 14160 as an illustrative example. When a single plaintiff files suit and prevails, that plaintiff is (at least potentially) deemed a citizen of the United States, but no one else is affected by the ruling. The plaintiff has no incentive to appeal, having won. The United States can simply choose not to appeal, knowing that the ruling is limited to that one plaintiff and that it can continue to enforce the (plainly unconstitutional) executive order against anyone who has not brought a lawsuit.  Thus, the legality of the executive order might be extremely unlikely to reach the appellate courts at all if each ruling is limited to the parties to that action.

The Court’s majority suggested that class actions may be the solution. While affected persons or companies now may need to turn to class actions to broadly challenge unconstitutional laws or executive orders, and while such challenges may ultimately be effective, class actions are generally slower, more expensive, and more complicated than other actions. Thus, the majority’s ruling unquestionably makes it more difficult to challenge unconstitutional laws or orders like  Executive Order 14160.

Returning to the political nature of this issue, if you are anti-immigrant, you may think it is desirable that the Court has made it more difficult to challenge the administration’s executive orders. But consider the long-term consequences. Suppose you favor strong rights for gun owners. If the next president has a different view on gun rights, that president could enter an executive order requiring all guns to be seized. If the courts are limited to injunctions affecting the named parties, the government could seize a lot of guns before the issue makes its way to the Supreme Court, if it ever does. Or suppose you want to get your children vaccinated for the measles, but the government issues an executive order banning all vaccines—you would personally have to file a lawsuit to obtain the right to get your child vaccinated even if the order was plainly unlawful.

The current framework does not seem to provide the perfect procedure for challenging an unconstitutional law or executive order. In balance, however, universal injunctions seem to provide a better vehicle than a series of limited, potentially conflicting rulings by individual judges.

Personal Jurisdiction

The court issued two personal jurisdiction cases this month, Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org., and CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. These cases both address the personal jurisdiction analysis for claims brought under statutes in which Congress has vested the courts with personal jurisdiction over defendants to claims brought pursuant to the statutes. Fuld involved claims brought against the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine Authority under the Antiterrorism Act and the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, which deems these entities to have consented to personal jurisdiction in Antiterrorism Act cases if they have paid salaries to terrorists in Israeli prisons and to families of deceased terrorists or have conducted activities on U.S. soil. CC/Devas involved a claim against an arm of the Indian government under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

In both cases, the Supreme Court authorized the exercise of personal jurisdiction without requiring the traditional “minimum contacts” test. Fuld contains the more broadly applicable framework, but even it leaves more questions unanswered than answered. In Fuld, the Court held that the personal jurisdiction analysis under the Fifth Amendment (limiting actions by the federal government) is different from the personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment (limiting actions by state governments). The court found that the traditional minimum contacts analysis was designed, in part, to ensure “that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” Those inter-state federalism concerns are not present when Congress has imbued the federal courts, nationwide, with personal jurisdiction over defendants in claims created by federal statute.

The Court expressly limited this holding to claims under federal statutes that expressly establish personal jurisdiction. Thus, at least for now, state law claims in federal court based on diversity or supplemental jurisdiction should still be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment minimum contacts analysis. Likewise, even claims in federal court under a federal statute should be subject to the minimum contacts analysis if the statute in question does not purport to create personal jurisdiction.

Essentially, all we now know is that a claim is brought under a federal statute that creates personal jurisdiction is subject to a Fifth Amendment personal jurisdiction analysis, not a Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction analysis, and that the Fifth Amendment analysis does not entail a minimum contacts evaluation. The Court declined to specify precisely what the Fifth Amendment personal jurisdiction analysis does entail, finding it easily satisfied for the claims against the PLO and the PA regardless of its precise contours. Accordingly, we will have to wait for future cases to learn what that analysis looks like (but let’s hope it doesn’t take as long as it took the Court to develop the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, which is still evolving 80 years after International Shoe).

Reopening a Judgment to Amend the Complaint

In BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, the Court clarified the legal standard when a plaintiff seeks to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint. In BLOM, another Antiterrorism Act case, the defendant—a bank accused of funding terrorists—argued that the complaint did not adequately allege that the bank was aware of the terroristic activities of its clients. The plaintiffs declined the court’s invitation to amend their complaint, instead choosing to rely on their contention that its allegations were adequate. When the district court eventually dismissed their complaint with prejudice and the circuit court affirmed that decision, the plaintiffs returned to the district court requesting that the court vacate the judgment and allow them to amend the complaint.

The question before the court in that situation was whether the motion was controlled by the liberal standard for amending pleadings under Rule 15 or the “extraordinary circumstances” standard for vacating a final judgment under Rule 60(b). The Supreme Court chose the Rule 60(b) standard, explaining that the court may consider the request to amend as contributing to the extraordinary circumstances required to vacate a judgment, but should not apply the liberal standard for amending pleadings.

Plausibility Pleading

In Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Mexico sued a number of gun manufacturers alleging that they committed torts by deliberately selling guns to shady dealers who illegally imported those guns into Mexico for use by Mexico’s drug cartels. The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act prohibits most tort claims against gun manufacturers, but contains an exception for when the manufacturers aid and abet the commission of a crime. The complaint contained multiple detailed allegations regarding the knowledge of the manufacturers that some of its guns would reach the drug cartels and be used by the members of those cartels for violence.

The Supreme Court held that the complaint nonetheless failed to state a claim. Aiding and abetting requires active, intentional participation, whereas the complaint only alleged “indifference” and “passive nonfeasance” rather than participation in an activity which the manufacturers “sought by their action to make succeed.” Because the allegations in the complaint simply showed that the manufacturers treated these suspect dealers the same way they treated all dealers, the Court concluded, the complaint failed to plausibly allege aiding and abetting.

Jury Trial Right

The Supreme Court also issued two jury trial opinions. In Perttu v. Richards, the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to have the jury decide whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies because that threshold issue was so intertwined in the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that having the judge decide that issue would deprive the plaintiff of his Seventh Amendment rights. In SEC v. Jarkesy, the Court held that Jarkesy had a right under the Seventh Amendment to have the SEC’s penalty proceeding against him heard by a jury, essentially holding that administrative proceedings regarding civil penalties were unconstitutional.

Both cases were divided decisions with strenuous dissents, but the alignment of the Justices was quite different in the two cases. In Jarkesy, the three liberal Justices advocated for authorizing the SEC to impose civil penalties on its own (subject to subsequent judicial review) whereas the conservative Justices sided with the businessman and against regulatory authority, instead requiring a jury’s involvement to impose civil penalties. Conversely, in Perttu, the liberal Justices (joined by Justices Roberts and Gorsuch) favored the rights of the prisoner at issue while the conservative Justices voted to block the prisoner’s claim.

Thus, while the result of both cases was the upholding of the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights, the Justices on both sides of the political spectrum changed their views on the parties’ right to a jury trial according to their presumed ideological bents. Although both sides articulated legal, non-political grounds for their positions, a skeptic might find these outcomes to be result-oriented.

Premature Notices of Appeal

Finally, in Parrish v. United States, the Court considered whether a premature notice of appeal should “relate forward” to the opening of the appeals window. Parrish, a prisoner, brought a civil rights action. The district court dismissed his case, but he was transferred to a different prison before he received notice of the decision. When he finally received notice, he filed a notice of appeal. At that point in time, however, his period for appeal had long lapsed. The courts treated his notice of appeal as a request for leave to reopen the appeal period and eventually granted that request. Parrish did not file a second notice of appeal during the new appeals window, so the issue arose as to whether his premature notice was effective. The Supreme Court held that it was—while a late notice of appeal can be fatal to a party’s appellate rights, an early notice of appeal will relate forward to the beginning of the appeal period.

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Steve is one of the authors of The Federal Litigator, a monthly publication from Thomson Reuters that reports on cases of general interest to those who practice in the federal courts. Each fall, The Federal Litigator reports on amendments to the federal court rules. This article is an excerpt from the April 2025 edition of The Federal Litigator that is reprinted with the publisher’s permission (© 2025 Thomson Reuters). Further reproduction of any kind is strictly prohibited. For further information about this publication, please click here, or call 800.328.9352. Individual case summaries can be accessed through Westlaw. Steve is also one of the authors of the Federal Civil Rules Handbook, an annual publication from Thomson Reuters containing detailed, practical commentary providing a blueprint for the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and related jurisprudential concepts. To purchase the Handbook, please click here.